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- Subject: MICHIGAN v. LUCAS, Syllabus
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-
-
-
- NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as
- is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
- issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but
- has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
- reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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-
- Syllabus
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- MICHIGAN v. LUCAS
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-
- certiorari to the court of appeals of michigan
-
- No. 90-149. Argued March 26, 1991 -- Decided May 20, 1991
-
- Michigan's "rape-shield" statute generally prohibits a criminal defendant
- from introducing at trial evidence of an alleged rape victim's past sexual
- conduct. However, a statutory exception permits a defendant to introduce
- evidence of his own past sexual conduct with the victim, provided that he
- files a written motion and an offer of proof within 10 days after he is
- arraigned, whereupon the trial court may hold an in camera hearing to
- determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible. Because respondent
- Lucas failed to give the statutorily required notice and, therefore, no
- admissibility hearing was held, a state court refused to let him introduce,
- at his bench trial on charges of criminal sexual assault, evidence of a
- prior sexual relationship with the victim, his ex-girlfriend. He was
- convicted and sentenced to prison, but the State Court of Appeals reversed,
- adopting a per se rule that the statutory notice-andhearing requirement
- violates the Sixth Amendment in all cases where it is used to preclude
- evidence of a past sexual relationship between a rape victim and a criminal
- defendant.
-
- Held:
-
- 1. Assuming, arguendo, that the Michigan rape-shield statute authorizes
- preclusion of the evidence as a remedy for a defendant's failure to comply
- with the notice-and-hearing requirement, the State Court of Appeals erred
- in adopting a per se rule that such preclusion is unconstitutional in all
- cases. The Sixth Amendment is not so rigid. The noticeand-hearing
- requirement serves legitimate state interests: protecting rape victims
- against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy and
- protecting against surprise to the prosecution. This Court's decisions
- demonstrate that such interests may justify even the severe sanction of
- preclusion in an appropriate case. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400,
- 413-414, 417; United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 241. Pp. 4-7.
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- 2. The Michigan courts must address in the first instance whether the
- rape-shield statute authorizes preclusion and whether, on the facts of this
- case, preclusion violated Lucas' Sixth Amendment rights. P. 8.
-
- Vacated and remanded.
-
- O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.
- J., and White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J.,
- filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed a
- dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined.
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